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Generating secure random numbers is vital to the security and privacy infrastructures we rely on today. Having a computer system
generate a secure random number is not a trivial problem due to the deterministic nature of computer systems. Servers commonly deal
with this problem through hardware-based random number generators, which can come in the form of expansion cards, dongles, or
integrated into the CPU itself. With the explosion of network- and internet-connected devices, however, the problem of cryptography
is no longer a server-centric problem; even small devices need a reliable source of randomness for cryptographic operations – for
example, network devices and appliances like routers, switches and access points, as well as various Internet-of-Things (IoT) devices for
security and remote management. This paper proposes a software solution based on side-channel measurements as a source of high-
quality entropy (nicknamed “SideRand”), that can theoretically be applied to most platforms (large servers, appliances, even maker
boards like RaspberryPi or Arduino), and generates a seed for a regular CSPRNG to enable proper cryptographic operations for security
and privacy. This paper also proposes two criteria – openness and auditability – as essential requirements for confidence in any random
generator for cryptographic use, and discusses how SideRand meets the two criteria (and how most hardware devices do not).
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 Generating Random Numbers for Privacy and Security
The ability to generate strong random numbers is essential to cryptography, and central to security and privacy in the IT world. For our
encryption technologies to function as expected, we rely on cryptographically secure pseudo-random number generators (CSPRNG) to
actually produce high-quality random numbers suitable for cryptography. (For the purposes of this paper, “secure random number” will
be used as shorthand to refer to “high-quality random number suitable for cryptography”; this refers mostly to how the random
number was derived, and not any physical or inherent characteristic of any particular number itself)
Having a computer system generate a secure random number is a difficult task due to the deterministic nature of computers.
Although random-generating algorithms have long existed, such as linear congruential generators (LCG) or the Mersenne Twister,
these are not CSPRNGs (i.e, not suitable for use in cryptography). Hardware-based random number generators (called TRNGs or True
Random Number  Generators)  are  a  common  solution,  particularly  for  servers  that  require  massive  amounts  of  entropy.  TRNGs
typically  measure  quantum  random  properties  such  as  nuclear  decay,  or  classical  random  properties  such  as  thermal  noise  or
atmospheric noise.
Being essential to security, some TRNGs have already made their way into CPUs themselves. VIA C3, released in 2003, has a
TRNG built-in marketed as the VIA Padlock RNG [7, 22]. Intel also baked-in a TRNG into their CPUs starting in 2011 with the release
of the Ivy Bridge architecture. [15, 17]
1.2 Appliances and Devices
While traditional servers may consider the problem of generating secure random numbers solved due to  easy access to TRNGs (a point
I dispute in the next section), the world’s security infrastructure does not rest solely in the hands of these servers. Heninger et al [18,
19] found widespread factorable and duplicate TLS and SSH keys due to embedded devices suffering from “boot-time entropy hole”.
This reveals a problem, mostly an economic/financial  one,  that also has to be solved: cheap devices and appliances do not have
integrated TRNGs in them, and the resulting lack of entropy has caused a failure in their cryptographic protocols, which ended up
producing thousands of duplicates of keys for TLS certificates in the wild and vulnerable RSA and DSA keys.
First version release date: April 8, 2018. 
Author’s address: JV Roig, Advanced Research Center – Asia Pacific College, 3 Humabon Place, Magallanes, Makati City, 1232, Philippines. 
Email: jvroig@gmail.com (primary), jvr@apc.edu.ph (institutional email).
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not
made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and fully cited. Copyrights for third-party components of this
work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the author.
Ideally, manufacturers or vendors should shell out the money to make sure their devices deal with entropy (or its shortage),
equipping their devices or appliances with a TRNG somehow. In the real world, pragmatism tends to miss out, and if the added cost of
including a TRNG does not make financial sense, manufacturers and vendors will continue selling vulnerable devices.
A software solution here would be superior, especially if one can be applied cost-free (such as Open Source software) and the
implementation is also simple and straightforward (i.e., not a significant burden to their existing development team)
1.3 The problem with hardware-based TRNGs
In late 2013, due to the Snowden revelations, the TRNGs that were integrated into the CPUs themselves – Intel’s DRNG and VIA’s
Padlock RNG – have fallen into suspicion [11, 12].
Whether the NSA has truly backdoored these by compelling Intel / VIA is not the central problem. The real problem is that these
implementations are effectively blackboxes and are impossible to audit,  especially in a live environment (there’s no way you can
actually audit the hardware circuit without destroying your CPU). For something so essential and central to cryptography and our
security and privacy, we should not be depending on blackboxes.
Hardware devices also eventually fail. Aside from possibly being open and auditable, an acceptable software solution is superior
to TRNGs in this regard, since software does not go bad like hardware does. Hardware random number generators do come with safety
and health checks, but this is not a total safeguard – TRNG failure can result in service interruption that lasts until the specific device is
replaced, since the computer system relying on it may have no other source of secure random numbers.
1.4 Proposed Criteria for Confidence in Sources of Secure Random Numbers
I propose two important criteria for sources of secure random numbers:
1. Openness -  being so central to privacy and security, whatever our source of secure random numbers should be truly open, as
in Open Source – with the entire algorithm available – and not a blackbox. If the algorithm is truly a CSPRNG, then the
algorithm itself need not be secret. The method of generating secure random numbers should be easily studied and reviewed
by interested parties. This is essential so that the very core of our security and privacy technologies is not something that can
easily be backdoored or otherwise tampered with by nation-states and their security agencies.
2. Auditability –  an  extension  of  Openness,  this  criteria  demands  that  aside  from  being  open  in  spirit  (which  is  easily
accomplished by releasing something under an Open Source license and hosting the code publicly, such as through GitHub),
the  program  itself  is  practically auditable  –  that  is,  it  is  as  simple  as  possible,  and  avoids  forms  of  programming  or
implementation “cleverness” that make the act of review harder. 
These criteria are not meant to judge the quality of sources of random numbers – the quality of a PRNG and its suitability for
cryptographic use is already well-served with entropy estimations (which I discuss in the Analysis section) along with necessary
properties. Instead, these criteria deal with our confidence in the source, i.e., the level of trust – e.g., confidence that it has not been
tampered with, backdoored, or otherwise obviously broken in some manner.
A 25,000-line algorithm that is mostly monolithic, for example, can easily be released as Open Source and hosted in a public
GitHub repository. However, while it passes criteria #1 easily, it may not pass criteria #2, since being a monolithic, 25,000-line monster
will make it extremely hard or impractical to thoroughly review and audit,  which will lessen confidence in it as a trusted source,
regardless of the quality of its output. In such a case, we would be better off with a similarly open, but far less complex implementation,
which is easier to have reviewed and audited, and therefore more trusted.
1.5 Roadmap
The rest of the paper deals with the author’s development of SideRand – a heuristic and prototype (coded in Python 3) that produces
randomness based on side-channel measurements (solving the “computers are deterministic” wall that prevents CPUs from casually
producing  secure  random numbers).  Throughout  the  development  of  SideRand,  including  the  incubation  stage  where  ideas  were
considered, refined, and discarded, I was guided by the two proposed criteria for confidence in sources of secure random numbers. In
particular, criteria #2, auditability, has resulted in the incremental prototypes of SideRand becoming more and more streamlined as
possible, and removing instances of “cleverness” and replacing them with more obvious, straightforward code.
2. BACKGROUND
2.1 Shortcomings of the Current State of Secure Random Number Generation
Being essential to cryptography and central to our security and privacy, the generation of secure random numbers was a topic that
interested me. Over the Christmas holidays of 2017, I thought about this problem, looked at the existing alternatives, and decided that
the current state is severely lacking and needs to be improved. Specifically:
1. Reliance on hardware-based TRNGs must end or be mitigated – hardware devices effectively act as blackboxes, are impractical
to audit in general, and next to impossible to audit within a live environment. Due to their blackbox nature, they are a natural
target  for nation-states  and their  intelligence apparatus.  Whether the NSA / China / Russia  has or has not backdoored
(through trickery or coercion) any TRNG is not the real problem – the problem is that they have been given a target to
backdoor due to widespread reliance on hardware random number generators that are next to impossible to audit. 
2. Current software solutions are lacking – software solutions either do not have enough theoretical backing, or are so complex
that it makes them impractical to review and audit, and thus prone to suspicion; sometimes, both are true [2, 3, 4, 14]. There is
also no solution currently available that is purposely designed as an architecture-and-platform-agnostic heuristic.
2.2 Timing Variability – the Benchmarker’s Bane
Variability of benchmark runtimes has long been a bane for hardware reviewers, testers, researchers, developers, and most other users
that rely on benchmark performance for key decisions (for example, whether a particular code change has actually sped up or slowed
down  a  particular  function).  When  measured  with  enough  precision,  benchmark  runtimes  can  vary  wildly,  and  are  generally
irreproducible.  This  applies  to  CPU  benchmarks,  GPU benchmarks,  benchmarks  of  other  hardware  (hard  disks,  SSDs,  etc),  and
especially to benchmarks that combine many of these components.
This was where I first started to imagine what would end up as the basis of the SideRand prototype – can CPU benchmark
variability be used as the basis of entropy collection to generate secure random numbers? This presents itself as an interesting target
for research and testing, since depending on variance of a benchmark runtime means using a side-channel measurement, instead of the
actual value of any mathematical operation which would be deterministic. If made to work, relying on a side-channel measurement of a
CPU would go a long way to solve the 2 problems mentioned in the previous section:
1. Reliance on hardware TRNG will be removed or mitigated, since everything that has a CPU – from large servers to small
embedded devices or appliances – can potentially benefit.
2. This type of software solution, being based on a side-channel, may survive cryptanalysis, since it does not depend on an
algorithm that may produce cyclical output.
2.3 CPU Variance
Assuming for now that the timing variability can be made to collect enough entropy to be suitable for cryptography, one obvious
shortcoming that needs to be addressed is the “same-CPU” weakness. That is, if one specific CPU (say, an Intel i7-7700K) produces
100,000 different unique runtimes for a specific benchmark (with the variations being measured in nanoseconds), can an attacker
produce the same 100,000 unique runtimes (thereby potentially making the proposed side-channel-based RNG predictable) if she buys
the exact same CPU and runs the exact benchmark? This means a potential fatal weakness would simply be: “find out potential possible
CPUs running in the target’s data center, buy these and make a table of potential values”
Fortunately,  the answer here is: CPU performance varies, even between two CPUs of the exact model, family and stepping.
Researchers from Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, for example, published a 2017 paper detailing an empirical survey of the
variation in  performance and energy efficiency in  their  clusters  of  servers  [5].  After characterizing  the performance and energy
efficiency of 4,000 CPUs, they found that no two processors had identical performance characteristics. This variation has not been
improving (i.e., not becoming less pronounced) as CPUs become more modern; instead, from Sandy Bridge (2 nd generation Intel Core
architecture) to Ivy Bridge (3rd generation) to Broadwell (5th generation), the variation in performance has increased between processors
of the same model, family and stepping.  I also present empirical data specific to SideRand that reinforces this, later on in the Entropy
Analysis section.
In a  nutshell,  since no two CPUs perform identically (given enough precision  in  measurement),  relying  on a side-channel
measurement based on benchmark runtime is not trivially exploitable by merely purchasing the same CPU model.
3. DESIGN AND EVOLUTION OF SIDERAND
3.1 Fundamental Design Notes
I developed SideRand based on the variability of benchmarks, and the design of which is guided by my proposed criteria for confidence
in sources of secure random numbers (openness and auditability). This section documents the evolution of SideRand prototypes, from
the first attempt (designated as “mark 1” or “mk1”), until the final prototype version (currently, Siderand mk10). I’ve opted to discuss
the evolution of the design from mark 1 to mark 10, instead of discussing only the final design of the mark 10 prototype, because
walking through the evolution of the prototype serves to better illustrate the problems and pitfalls that would be encountered in
creating a CSPRNG based on CPU side-channel measurements. Just as well, walking through the evolution of the prototypes will serve
to answer common questions that may arise if only the mk10 final prototype was discussed, especially about design decisions and
tradeoffs.
During the discussion of the specific versions of the SideRand prototype, some parts of the code will be displayed. However, the
full Python 3 source codes of each are also available online through the author’s SideRand site: http://research.jvroig.com/siderand. It is
recommended that the reader refer to the actual,  complete source codes for clarity.  If  the reader also has a Python 3 interpreter
installed, the prototypes are executable and can be tested with minimal effort.
3.2 SideRand mk1
The mark 1 prototype functioned as follows:
• A set of 100 random numbers is used as reference (this set of random numbers was generated using /dev/urandom of Linux)
and imported as random_set.
• Part 1: Each of the 100 random numbers is matched against each other, executing various math operations. Time to execute a
set of operations is recorded into an array that ends up with 100 runtimes, called tot (“total times”, set of all runtimes).
• Part 2: This array is then processed so that 50 differences (diffs) between runtimes are produced – the last (100th) runtime is
subtracted from the first runtime to get their difference, then the 99th runtime is subtracted from the 2nd, and so on. Each diff is
then hashed using SHA256. Effectively, the diffs capture the variances between two runtimes.
Here, “Part 1” and “Part 2” are merely logical distinctions to make discussions easier, particularly across prototype versions. Part
1  runs the benchmarks and collects  the runtime measurements.  Part  2  produces  the diffs from the measurements  collected,  and
generates the output based on the diffs through SHA256.
The source code for SideRand is shown below.
ALGORITHM 1:  SideRand mk1
import time
from random100 import random_set
import hashlib
def get_entropy():
    limit = len(random_set) - 1
    scale = 50
    tot = []
    i = 0
    while i <= limit:
        j = 0
        while j <= limit:
            k = 0
            time_s = time.time()
            while k < scale:
                a1 = random_set[i] + random_set[j]
                a2 = (random_set[i] - random_set[j])
                a3 = (random_set[i] * random_set[j])
                a4 = (random_set[i] / random_set[j])
                a5 = (a3 * random_set[i]) / (a4 * random_set[j])
                k += 1
            time_e = time.time()
            tot.append((time_e - time_s))
            j += 1
        i += 1
    f = open('random_numbers','wb')
    limit = int(len(tot) / 2)
    i = 0
    while i < limit:
        diff = tot[i] - tot[limit - i]
        if diff > 0:
            h = hashlib.sha256(str(diff).encode())
            f.write(h.digest())
        i += 1
get_entropy()
Algorithm one shows the entire source code, from imports, subroutine definition (including the “def” call itself), and the final line
that calls the subroutine. Since only the subroutine definition itself changes, most of the succeeding Algorithm sections will show only
the subroutine definition or specific portions of it, omitting the import lines, def line, and the get_entropy() line.
There is some good here already, but a lot more bad.  
The good part is simply that the code is very short, essentially a nested-loop in order to match every element of the set of the 100
random numbers to each other. If it works as expected, then it would be easy to audit due to length and simplicity.
The bad part is that it does not actually work – even though the output is a SHA256 hash, it still fails the FIPS 140-2 statistical
test, as implemented in Linux through the rngtest module. This shows that it is horribly broken.
3.3 SideRand mk2
The mk2 prototype tries to fix mk1 by making a change in the implementation of Part 2, shown below.
ALGORITHM 2:  SideRand mk2 source code, Part 2 area only
    limit = int(len(tot)) #use if diff = tot[i] - tot[i + 1]
    i = 0
    while i < limit:
        diff1 = (tot[i] - tot[i + 1])
        diff2 = (tot[i] * tot[i + 1])
        diff3 = abs(tot[i] - tot[i + 1])
        diff = str(diff1) + str(diff2) + str(diff3)
        h = hashlib.sha256(str(diff).encode())
        h.update(str(tot[i]).encode())
        h.update(str(tot[i+1]).encode())
        f.write(h.digest())
        i += 2 
The change here made Part  2 more complicated.  Instead of a  simple subtraction operator to produce the diffs,  it  is  now a
combination of subtraction, multiplication, and absolute value subtraction, all of which are then concatenated together.
There is still not much good to be had here. In fact, this attempt is arguably worse than mk1: it has become more complicated, but
still can only pass rngtest below 90% of the time. It is still horribly broken.
3.4 SideRand mk3
The mk3 prototype made another change to Part 2, shown in Algorithm 3. This time, an attempt to clean the measurements is made by
removing all leading zeroes, decimal points, and spaces from each diff – for example, a measurement of “0.000000012345” will now just
be “12345”. The hashing portion is also changed – instead of immediately hashing one diff, the entire set of diffs are hashed. The way
the diffs are generated have also been changed, and are now separated into batches.
The changes here have made the SideRand mk3 prototype pass ~95% of the type – a marked improvement, but still well below
what is expected from a CSPRNG.
What should the passing rate be? The passing rate should be ~99.92%, which  is what the Linux random devices (/dev/random and
/dev/urandom/) obtain when they are piped to rngtest. I obtained this figure from a different experiment (2017, still to be published) that
passed over 40 terabytes of randomness from /dev/random and /dev/urandom to rngtest. Since that experiment cannot be cited yet as it
is also still being prepared for publication, I’m sharing a simple way to verify the ~99.92% figure. On any Linux system with rngtest
available (courtesy of the rng-tools package) simply run the following: 
rngtest -c 5000 < /dev/urandom
In any modern Intel processor, you can also test /dev/random the same way:
rngtest -c 5000 < /dev/random
Tabulating multiple runs will converge to ~99.92% passing rate for both. You may also look at the aforementioned experiment
data through the website for that experiment: http://research.jvroig.com/linuxrand
Since 95% is still well below the ~99.92% target, SideRand mk3 is still broken. Worse, the code has become progressively more
complicated, shown below.
ALGORITHM 3:  SideRand mk3 source code, Part 2 area only
    batch = 10
    limit = int(len(tot)) / batch
    i = 0
    megadiff = []
    while i < limit:
        diff = []
        j = 0
        while  j < batch:
            j += 1
            string_num  = "{:22.21f}".format(abs(tot[i] - tot[i+j])).replace(".","").replace(" ","")
            # find where the 0s stop
            k = 0
            mark = 0
            length = len(string_num)
            while k < length:
                if string_num[k] != '0':
                    mark = k
                    break
                k += 1
            if k < length:
                string_num = string_num[mark:length]
                diff.append(string_num)
                megadiff.append(string_num)
            h = hashlib.sha256(str(set(diff)).encode())
            f.write(h.digest())
        i += 10
3.5 SideRand mk0
As a sanity check, a mk0 prototype was created, just to verify that something must indeed be terribly broken in all previous prototypes
since even a SHA256-hashed output fails to pass  rngtest sufficiently. The mk0 prototype is nothing but an incrementor,  from 0 to
100,000 with each step (in increments of 1) being hashed through SHA256, as displayed in Algorithm 4.
ALGORITHM 4:  SideRand mk0 – not a real prototype, but a sanity-check
    limit = 100000
    with open('random_numbers','ab') as f:
        i = 0
        h = hashlib.sha256(str(i).encode())
        while i < limit:
            i += 1
            h.update(str(i).encode())
            f.write(h.digest())
The goal of this sanity check was to verify that the fundamentals are correct with regards to SHA256 – if it is not asked to hash
repeating inputs, then its output should pass rngtest with a rate that is no different than output from /dev/urandom or /dev/random. And
indeed this was the case. SideRand mk0 easily passes ~99.92% of the time. This small experiment shows that all previous prototypes
must have ended up supplying values that repeat enough that even a SHA256 output fails rngtest.
3.6 SideRand mk4
The mk4 prototype addresses the weaknesses of the first 3 prototypes by collecting more samples (i.e., more timing info due to having
much more operations), creating a major change in the Part 1 area of the source code. Significant change in the Part 2 area was also
done, particularly for the introduction of the “stretch” parameter, which applies key stretching in order to produce more bits in the
output. Key stretching does not affect the actual entropy of the system, merely its suitability for practical usage (i.e., increasing the
throughput of random bits creation, not increasing the system entropy).
SideRand mk4 is the first actual prototype that passes rngtest with the same passing rate as the Linux random devices - ~99.92%. 
While this is good, the code has become cluttered, complex, and is marked with “cleverness” - for example, tons of operations are
done because they seem random, chaotic and unpredictable. Unfortunately, there is really no justification for them from a theoretic
perspective – for example, why those particular operations are repeated and recorded twice, and why the fifth set of operations (a
combo of  multiplication and division)  was  designed as  it  was.  I  believe  this  does  not  reflect  the ideals  that  the  two criteria  for
confidence in sources of secure random numbers strive for – not only is there no theoretical backing to these complex operations, they
are nothing more than “cleverness” that hinder auditability.
ALGORITHM 5: SideRand mk4 source code for the Part 1 area. It has become longer for no justifiable reason other than it seems to
work
    limit = len(random_set) - 1
    tot = []
    i = 0
    while i <= limit:
        j = 0
        while j <= limit:
            time_s = time.time()
            a1 = random_set[i] + random_set[j]
            time_e = time.time()
            tot.append((time_e - time_s))
            time_s = time.time()
            a1 = random_set[i] + random_set[j]
            time_e = time.time()
            tot.append((time_e - time_s))
            time_s = time.time()
            a2 = (random_set[i] - random_set[j])
            time_e = time.time()
            tot.append((time_e - time_s))
            time_s = time.time()
            a2 = (random_set[i] - random_set[j])
            time_e = time.time()
            tot.append((time_e - time_s))
            time_s = time.time()
            a3 = (random_set[i] * random_set[j])
            time_e = time.time()
            tot.append((time_e - time_s))
            time_s = time.time()
            a3 = (random_set[i] * random_set[j])
            time_e = time.time()
            tot.append((time_e - time_s))
            time_s = time.time()
            a4 = (random_set[i] / random_set[j])
            time_e = time.time()
            tot.append((time_e - time_s))
            time_s = time.time()
            a4 = (random_set[i] / random_set[j])
            time_e = time.time()
            tot.append((time_e - time_s))
            time_s = time.time()
            a5 = (a3 * random_set[i]) / (a4 * random_set[j])
            time_e = time.time()
            tot.append((time_e - time_s))
            time_s = time.time()
            a5 = (a3 * random_set[i]) / (a4 * random_set[j])
            time_e = time.time()
            tot.append((time_e - time_s))
            j += 1
        i += 1
3.7 SideRand mk5
The mk5 prototype is an attempt to streamline the mk4 prototype, while retaining the rngtest passing rate.  In the Part 1 area of the
code, the main loop has been significantly simplified and now only does 1 operation. In the Part 2 area of the code, much of the
simplicity was achieved by removing the codes that removed zeroes, decimal points, and formatting. These were all unnecessary, since
all values would be run through SHA256 anyway, and were not the source of failures of earlier prototypes (rather, they failed due to
duplicate diffs, which formatting and removal of leading zeroes would not mitigate in the slightest). 
Also in the Part 2 area of the code, creating the diffs, which used to be a subtraction operation (hence, the “diff” term), was
changed to a multiplication operation. Tests showed that the diffs gathered had more unique values when the collected runtimes were
multiplied instead of subtracted. Intuitively, this also checks out, since a subtraction operation in a set of numbers are more likely to
result in similar values. For example, a set of runtime values containing 0.0003, 0.0002, and 0.0001, when each element is subtracted
with each other, we would get the following values: 0.0001 (from 0.0003 – 0.0002), .0002 (0.0003 – 0.0001), 0.0001 (0.0002 – 0.0001). With
the same set and distribution, but this time using a multiplication operation, we would get no duplicate values: 0.00000006, 0.00000003,
and 0.00000002. For our case, then, subtraction lessens the entropy we can collect, whereas multiplication does not – or, at least, at this
stage in the prototypes, lessens the entropy much less than a subtraction operation would.
Algorithm 6 shows the entirety of SideRand mk5 code, now back to being more manageable thanks to the streamlining of mk4
code, with only about 50 lines of code.
ALGORITHM 6: SideRand mk5 source code – much simpler than mk4
    limit = len(random_set) - 1
    tot = []
    i = 0
    while i <= limit:
        j = 0
        while j <= limit:
            samples = 10
            k = 0
            while k < samples:
                time_s = time.time()
                a1 = random_set[i] + random_set[j]
                time_e = time.time()
                tot.append((time_e - time_s))
                k += 1
            j += 1
        i += 1
    f = open('random_numbers','ab')
    limit = len(tot)
    i = 0
    diff = []
    while i < limit:
        num = tot[i] * tot[i+1]
        diff.append(num)
        i += 2
    stretch = 10000
    i = 0
    time_s = time.time()
    h = hashlib.sha256(str(diff).encode())
    digest = h.digest()
    f.write(digest)
    time_e = time.time()
    time_p = time_e - time_s
    while i < stretch:
        time_s = time.time()
        i += 1
        h.update(digest + str(i).encode()
                        + str(time_s).encode()
                        + str(time_e).encode()
                        + str(time_p).encode())
        digest = h.digest()
        time_e = time.time()
        time_p = time_e - time_s
        f.write(digest)
3.8 SideRand mk6
SideRand mk6 was an experiment to see if a smaller random set of numbers can be used as the basis for the operations in the Part 1
area (the benchmarking code). All previous prototypes used a set of 100 random numbers; mk6 only used a set of 20 random numbers
as the basis of its benchmark operations. Since far less computations will be executed, the samples parameter was increased – from an
original value of 10,  new values of 100 and 250 were also tested.
The rngtest passing rate was unchanged, at still ~99.92%. However, with a samples parameter of only 10 (same as mk5), unique
values produced per execution dropped – whereas mk5 would typically report unique values of 100-150 per run,  mk6 would only have
about 20-40 unique values. Increasing the samples parameter to 100 bumps up the typical unique values per run to ~70-90. Increasing
samples to 250 results in typically the same number of unique values per run as mk5.
3.9 SideRand mk7
The mk7 prototype tested out different timer functions in Python3, specifically time.time() (which is what all previous prototypes have
been using),  time.clock(),  time.perf_counter(),  and  time.process_time(). Of the 4,  time.clock() was immediately disqualified, due to the
official docs declaring it deprecated. 
From testing, both time.perf_counter() and time.process_time() have at least 100x better resolution than time.time() in Linux, which
makes them far more ideal for benchmarking. In Windows, time.time() has an extremely low resolution, 16ms, and isn’t a viable timer.
Having better resolution (more precision / decimal places for runtimes) directly gives the system more entropy overall, as otherwise
unmeasurable timing differences using  time.time() are now measurable. Unique values per run have skyrocketed from ~100-150, to
about 5,000 per run, due to the significant increase in timer resolution. Timer resolution varies between platforms, but Python 3 makes
it easy enough to check by simply using time.get_clock_info() [20].
The final choice for an improved timer function was time.perf_counter(), since testing revealed that time.process_time() does not
wok as expected in Windows platforms. Official documentation on time.process_time() also mention that it tracks only the execution
time of the process itself (hence the name), and ignores slowdowns caused by external factors. This is not optimal for SideRand usage,
since any variance,  internal  or external  to the process  itself  (such as task switching due to other background tasks),  is  useful  to
SideRand as more entropy.
3.10 SideRand mk8 and SideRand mk8b
There are still items to improve from the SideRand mk7 prototype: 
1. It still uses a set of 20 random numbers (which it inherited from mk6)
2. Relying purely on time.perf_counter() to be supported may not be optimal.
The first concern is for the desire for simplicity and utmost auditability. While a set of 20 random numbers is much smaller than
a set of 100 random numbers, it’s still a set of random numbers that we import, and that according to the premise of SideRand (timing
variance / runtime irreproducibility, with enough precison), shouldn’t matter at all. To fix this, the mk8 prototype does away with using
a set of random numbers. Instead, two values used are fixed. The exact values themselves are not important; the values that the mk8
prototype used are just two numbers generated at random, and then hard-coded into the prototype code. Figure 7 shows the Part 1 area
of the mk8 prototype, with the hard-coded numbers used in the benchmark operation. Using just 2 fixed values (compared to 100 and
20 of the previous prototypes) resulted in no difference in rngtest passing rate.
ALGORITHM 7: SideRand mk8 source code for the Part 1 area – val1 and val2 are just numbers that were randomly generated to be
placed in the code, with no special significance.
    val1 = 2585566630
    val2 = 576722363
    tot = []
    samples = 100
    scale = 1
    i = 0
    while i < samples:
        time_s = time.perf_counter()
        j = 0
        while j < scale:
            a1 = val1 + val2
            j += 1
        time_e = time.perf_counter()
        tot.append((time_e - time_s))
        i += 1
The second concern, reliance on  time.perf_counter(), is addressed by the addition of a scale factor (the  scale variable). This is
meant to be increased when the available timer does not have a high enough resolution. In mk8b, time.perf_counter() is swapped out for
time.time(), to simulate a scenario where the running system (which may be a VM, or a low-end device with a small, cheap  processor)
has a lower resolution. With a much lower resolution timer, the benchmark workload has to be increased so it is more measurable, so
the scale factor in mk8b was scaled up from 1 to 250. Scaling up the workload increased the unique values per run, demonstrating that
the scale factor can be used to compensate for a lower-resolution timer. This does increase runtime (since that is exactly what scale is
supposed to do – make the benchmark slower so that a lower-resolution timer can better distinguish one run from another), so there
would be a practical limit to how low resolution the timer can be, also affected by how slow or fast the processor is. 
ALGORITHM 8: SideRand mk8b source code for the Part 1 area – similar to mk8, with the scale variable set to 250, and the use of
time.time() instead of time.perf_counter(), to simulate a lower-res timer being used with an increased scale.
    val1 = 2585566630
    val2 = 576722363
    tot = []
    samples = 100
    scale = 250
    i = 0
    while i < samples:
        time_s = time.time()
        j = 0
        while j < scale:
            a1 = val1 + val2
            j += 1
        time_e = time.time()
        tot.append((time_e - time_s))
        i += 1 
 
3.11 SideRand mk9
The mk9 prototype improves the mk8 prototype with a change in the Part 1 area of the code that is merely superficial, and a change in
the Part 2 area of the code that affects the hash stretching done.
In the Part 1 area of the code,  tot (which originally meant total times) was simply renamed to the more informative times. The
stretch variable, used for key stretching the hash output in Part 2, was also moved up to Part 1 along with the other defined variables.
The changes in the Part 2 area improve the multiplication operation that creates the diffs (adding a 1 to each operand to make
sure any zero readings on either side of the operands do not result in a zero result), and also streamline the key stretching operation,
removing all unnecessary cruft. Previously, the hash stretching portion also had timer values (start time, end time, process time) and an
incrementor, all of which are mixed in with the digest of the diffs. This was done to make key stretching safer – there’s always new
content in each iteration of the stretching.  However, these are all unnecessary. If the collected entropy is truly impractical to predict or
brute-force (which should be the case in our quest to generate secure random numbers), then adding more measurements just to key
stretch is simply more work for no gain. And the reverse is also true – if in the first place the collected entropy is predictable or brute-
forceable, then adding more junk into the key stretch operation doesn’t make the collected entropy any better. The mk9 prototype then
strips away all this junk, the key stretching operation is now just the previous digest mixed with the entire diff set, i.e., the actual,
supposedly unpredictable and un-brute-forceable entropy.
ALGORITHM 9: SideRand mk9 source code
    val1 = 2585566630
    val2 = 576722363
    times = []
    samples = 100
    scale = 250
    stretch = 100
    i = 0
    while i < samples:
        time_s = time.perf_counter()
        j = 0
        while j < scale:
            a1 = val1 + val2
            j += 1
        time_e = time.perf_counter()
        times.append((time_e - time_s))
        i += 1
    limit = len(times)
    entropy = []
    i = 0
    while i < limit:
        num = (1 + times[i]) * (1 + times[i+1])
        entropy.append(num)
        i += 2
    entropy_bytes = str(entropy).encode()
    h = hashlib.sha256(entropy_bytes)
    digest = h.digest()
    f = open('random_numbers','ab')
    f.write(digest)
    i = 0
    while i < stretch:
        h.update(digest + entropy_bytes)
        digest = h.digest()
        f.write(digest)
        i += 1
 
3.12 SideRand mk10
The final prototype, mk10, introduces a much needed improvement in the entropy collection logic of the Part 2 area. The mk9 prototype
improved on the multiplication operation (multiplying two of the collected run times to each other) so that a zero value on one operand
would not result in a 0 (which biases collected entropy to having zeroes more common than other values). Recall that in the SideRand
mk5 prototype discussion, it was mentioned that subtraction lessens entropy, while multiplication does not (or at least only does so at a
much lesser degree). I realized, however, that even this multiplication operation is very unfriendly to entropy: from 100 measurements
taken (the default sample size in mk8 and mk9), the way entropy was collected into the diffs array ended up with having only 50
resulting values – effectively cutting in half the samples we took.
The real problem, of course, is that trying to subtract or multiply values to each other is a poor attempt at mixing. Not only did
we end up halving the collected values (from 100 varied measurements, down to 50), we ended up doing entropy collection twice –
once when we got 100 samples, then again when we derived 50 values from those 100 samples.
The best way to mix these values would be to just hash them together. The mk10 prototype was then written to remove the
multiplication operation. Instead, all 100 collected samples are hashed as is. The resulting hash is then subjected to key stretching, as
before. Since there is no more multiplication operation in-between the initial samples collection and the hash operation, we save about
8 lines of code and increase performance. Best of all, the entropy of the system is now more straightforward, which will help us
estimate the amount of entropy this prototype (and the heuristic in general) can have. The entropy gathered is simply the runtime
values the benchmark produces and the exact order they appear when we collect measurements.
ALGORITHM 10: SideRand mk10 source code
    val1 = 2585566630
    val2 = 576722363
    times = []
    samples = 100
    scale = 250
    stretch = 100
    i = 0
    while i < samples:
        time_s = time.perf_counter()
        j = 0
        while j < scale:
            a1 = val1 + val2
            j += 1
        time_e = time.perf_counter()
        times.append((time_e - time_s))
        i += 1
    samples_concat = str(times)
    diff_bytes = samples_concat.encode()
    h = hashlib.sha256(diff_bytes)
    digest = h.digest()
    f = open('random_numbers','ab')
    f.write(digest)
    i = 0
    while i < stretch:
        h.update(digest + diff_bytes)
        digest = h.digest()
        f.write(digest)
        i += 1
Now that a prototype exists that has a sufficiently simple and concise code, and that passes a rudimentary statistical analysis
(which merely means it is not  obviously broken, but proves nothing quality-wise from the perspective of generating secure random
numbers), we can proceed with analyzing the amount of entropy the proposed heuristic and prototype. 
4. ENTROPY ANALYSIS
4.1 “The Entropy Source We Deserve,  But Not the One We Need Right Now” 
The output of any random number generator cannot be used directly as proof of its suitability as a source for secure random numbers.
Fortunately, our cryptographic protocols also do not require that the source is true randomness. Instead, cryptographically secure
random number generators  merely need to be sufficiently unpredictable and have a ridiculously large key space (set  of  possible
outputs) such that brute-force attacks are infeasible within the applicable threat-model. To paraphrase Gordon in “The Dark Knight
(2008)”, “True randomness is the entropy source we deserve, but not the one we need right now.” 
The proposed heuristic, as implemented in the SideRand mk10 prototype, will be analyzed to see if it functions with enough
unpredictability and with a large enough key space to make it a reliable source for secure random numbers. Throughout the tests, the
scale factor within the SideRand code is tweaked to be appropriate to the speed and timer resolution of the machine. In general, the
scale factor has a direct relationship to CPU speed, and an inverse relationship to timer resolution – the faster the CPU, the greater the
scale factor, whereas the greater the timer resolution, the lesser scale factor is needed. The worst case would be a very fast CPU, with a
very low-res timer, such as using time.time() in Python 3 under Windows.
4.2 Key Space – Part One
To get data to  estimate the key space involved, a “unique_logger” tool was designed. This tool has two parts:
1. A file that is a slightly modified form of the SideRand prototype – instead of hashing the runtimes it collects, it logs them all
into a text file, one runtime per line.
2. A separate Python script that parses the resulting log file to catalog the number of unique values generated.
Several different machines were tested using the unique_logger tool running SideRand mk10.  The raw results, as well as the tool
itself for the reader’s own testing or inspection, can be found in the SideRand website linked to in section 3. In summary, the key space
analysis shows that the runtimes measured can have thousands of unique values, which depend largely on CPU speed, available timer
resolution, and the software stack.
With thousands of potential values - one of the best cases being 142,703 unique values logged - and with the raw random output
(i.e., the value that will be hashed) being a chronological sequence of 100 of these values (i.e., the specific order they were collected in,
not sorted in any way), that gives a ridiculous upper limit of  ~ 140,000 ^ 100.
This is the potential upper bound. It’s the stuff that the wild imaginations of a crypto-nerd (such as yours truly) are made of.
However, this potential key space will be greatly affected by predictability – it doesn’t matter if there is an unimaginably large set of
possible values if, in practice, there are really only a handful of values that appear 99% of the time.  To determine this, we need to
analyze the distribution of the runtime values.
4.3 Distribution
To  get  data  about  the  distribution  of  runtime  values,  another  tool  was  created,  and  was  still  rather-unimaginably  named:
distribution_checker. The distribution_checker tool is composed of the following components:
1. A file that is a slightly modified form of the SideRand prototype – instead of hashing the runtimes it collects, it returns the
entire set to the next component of the tool
2. The next component is the largest and most complex part of the tool (diff_distribution.py). This calls the first component,
receives  the  set  of  runtime values,  then  logs  them into  an  sqlite3  database.  This  also  supports  multithreading  so  that
distribution tests can be done with varied amounts threads.
3. A set of bash scripts were also created to automate tests using the pair of Python 3 files.
As with the earlier “unique_logger” tests, several different machines were tested. Each machine ran the SideRand mk10 prototype
3,000 times, producing 300,000 runtime measurements per machine. The raw results, corresponding image files of the distribution
graphs, as well as the distribution_checker tool itself, can be found as supplementary information in the SideRand website linked to in
section 3. Note that the graphs are generally very high-resolution, composed of thousands of values along the x-axis, and cannot be
faithfully reproduced in low-res within this paper without sacrificing the nuances that affect entropy estimation. Hence, the majority of
the graphs are saved in the supplemental website and not reproduced here, except for a select few to serve as illustration.
In summary, the distribution found in tests with distribution_checker has the following characteristics:
1. The distribution is multi-modal
2. The distribution is not uniformly-random across the entirety of all unique values logged
3. The shape of the distribution varies, even between CPU’s of the exact same model, family and stepping, running on the same
OS and Python version – for example, one machine can show three clear high peaks with three clear lower peaks, while an
identical machine shows something that is closer to a bimodal distribution (Figures 1 - 3).
4. If we limit the graph to a very small set of the most frequent values (e.g., considering only the top 20 most frequent values
out of thousands of collected values), the distribution tends toward flatness, i.e., almost uniformly-random (Figure 4)
 
Figure 1: Frequency distribution of all values, “Constitution” server (21,509 unique values)
Figure 2: Frequency distribution of all values, “Galaxy” server (19,176 unique values)
Figure 3: Frequency distribution of all values, “Intrepid” server (19,517 unique values)
Figure 4: Frequency distribution of top 20 values, “Sovereign” server (out of 14,127 total unique values)
The graphs reproduced here are meant only to give a sense of the comparative differences in general shape (Figures 1 – 3) as well
as the flat distribution of a small subset using the most frequent 20 values (Figure 4). Higher-resolution versions of these graphs for
readability and better analysis can be found as supplemental information in the SideRand website linked to in section 3.
4.4 Key Space – Part Two
Before  proceeding  to  analyze  the  entropy  using  the  knowledge  gained  from  the  unique_logger  and  distribution_checker  tools,
revisiting key space estimation is in order, to note that there is far more variability here than we can realistically model. For example,
while the graphs produced from the distribution_checker tests were compared and presented (found in supplemental  information
through the SideRand website),  the  actual  values across  the  x-axis  (runtimes)  are  not the same for  every  graph.  The values are
continuous in nature (nanoseconds or less). Comparing the top values of each server reveals little to no overlap, even across different
machines with the exact same CPU and OS. For example, in a cluster of 4 servers with identical hardware (CPU, motherboard, RAM,
harddisk) and identical OS (Linux - Fedora 25), comparing the top 500 runtime values collected by each server resulted in only two
overlaps. From a total of 2,000 runtime values, 1,998 were unique across all four servers.
What this  tells us is that,  whatever we can estimate from any single test from a single machine,  it  is  very likely that the
theoretical entropy in this heuristic is actually far greater. For example, in the earlier key space estimation subsection, the example of
one machine producing approximately 140,000 unique values was used to get a theoretical upper limit of 140,000^100. But since these
unique values, the specific runtimes recorded, are not the same for every machine (even among machines that have the exact same
CPU model/family/stepping), then the actual unique values that can be produced in the real world (with varying CPUs, platforms, and
even varying SideRand tuning) are far higher.  For platforms that have better than nanosecond resolution, there can be billions of
possible runtime values across different machines with different operating systems, CPUs, and software stack. Stringing a hundred of
these billions of possible values together, as SideRand does, likely has far more entropy than needed by any cryptographic use case.
4.5 Modeling Entropy Using Worst-Case Estimates
With the distribution being chaotic and multimodal, and with the x-axis values themselves being inconsistent across machines, it’s
impossible to exactly model the entropy found in SideRand.
Fortunately, there is a convenient way to estimate the entropy to determine suitability as a CSPRNG. We can simply model a
worst-case estimate based on the data collected, construct the worst-case estimate such that we know that the actual entropy is sure to
be far higher, and then compare this worst-case estimate against the standard that we need. If the worst-case scenario already meets or
exceeds the standard, then exactly modeling the entropy in the system is unnecessary since it would already be known to meet or
exceed the required standard.
For a cryptographically secure seed, a standard to meet is an entropy of at least 256 bits (approximately 1.15x10^77), from which
can be derived an unlimited number of keys using deterministic cryptography [8, 9, 10]. 128 bits of entropy was suggested by the IETF
in 2005 [13], but this paper will adopt a more conservative stance and aim for the stricter standard of 256 bits.
SideRand worst-case can be estimated as follows:
1. Instead of up to hundreds of thousands of unique values, let us assume there are only 20 values. In most of our tests, this
means we are effectively considering only the top 5% or less,  conveniently ignoring at least  95% of the runtime values
collected in order to model our worst-case estimate.
2. Based on distribution tests, the top 20 values are flattish, which we can treat as a uniformly random distribution.
3. SideRand collects 100 samples from those 20 possible values. With a uniformly random distribution, the key space is 20^100.
This gives us a worst-case entropy estimate of 1.26x10^130 (20^100), which far exceeds the requirement of 256 bits of entropy
(1.15x10^77). In reality, since we ignored around 95% of actual real values, we can be confident that the actual lower-bound of entropy
in this  system is  far greater than 1.26x10^130.  Since this  already exceeds the standard of 256 bits  of entropy for secure random
numbers, then it is unnecessary to determine the exact lower bound for now. Whatever it actually is, it is already far more than needed
for our cryptographic protocols.
4.6 Throughput Measurements
How long does one run of SideRand take? 
In standard Intel or AMD-based machines running mainstream Linux distributions, SideRand with a scale of 2000 takes less than
a tenth of a second on average. Specifically tested Linux distributions were Fedora 25, CentOS 7.4, and Ubuntu 16.04, and Ubuntu 17.10.
Even “small core” architectures – such as Intel Atom and AMD Bobcat cores – take less than 0.1 seconds on average. Benchmark results
are available as supplementary information in the SideRand website linked to in section 3.
This means solving the boot-time entropy hole problem for headless Linux servers, as described by Heninger et al in [18, 19] is
inexpensive to solve. There is virtually no cost in terms of additional processing time to collect entropy that we estimated, at worst, to
be well in excess of 256 bits.
4.7 Where the Variance Comes From
It may be worthwhile at this point to mention why this runtime variance between benchmark runs exists.
Modern CPUs contain millions to billions of transistors – even the ARM Cortex-A9, released over ten years ago (2007), has an
estimated 26 million transistors. These transistors that make up a CPU are not perfectly uniform (as truly nothing humans create ever
are, when measured with enough precision), and transistor variability has long been something that CPU designers cope with, such as
designing for the worst case (guard-banding). Aside from transistor variability itself, there are also systematic variability (caused by
manufacturing, with CPU binning as a common coping strategy) and local variability (random dopant fluctuation) [21]. These factors
make CPUs unique from each other, even those that come from the same wafer and binned as the exact same model, family and
stepping. CPU enthusiasts, especially overclockers, refer to this as the “silicon lottery”.
This variation between CPUs that are sold as identical is not getting better (smaller). As the LLNL team found in [5], this variance
has only increased with more recent processors (e.g.,  Broadwell microarchitecture compared to Ivy Bridge microarchitecture).  The
reason for this is the improvement in dynamic frequency scaling features in most CPUs – whereas these “turbo” features in multi-core
architectures used to be very blunt (a fixed frequency if only 1 core is operating, a slightly lower fixed frequency with an additional
core operating,  etc),  current implementations from Intel,  AMD and ARM-based processors  offer  turbo-like  features  with  smarter
capabilities  that  take  into  account  estimated  current  consumption,  estimated  power  consumption,  and  processor  temperature
(respectively, Intel Turbo Boost Techonology 2.0, AMD SenseMI / Extended Frequency Range, ARM DVFS technology)  [1, 6, 16] .
These variances that stem from the transistor level also affect repeated runs of the same physical CPU. Execution of the same
instruction and data won’t take the exact same path each time – i.e., each run would not be using the exact same transistors (be they
transistors in the CPU registers, cache, or execution units).  The physical location of the data, for example, also results in runtime
variance due to latency differences – one run, for example, may have the data on physically one end of the cache, whereas the other
run  may  have  the  same  data  on  the  other  end  of  the  cache.  These  variations  can  be  as  small  as  nanoseconds  or  fractions  of
nanoseconds.
Aside from the practical, real-world consideration of needing a CPU and platform that offers reasonable timer resolution, the
only way that this side-channel-based secure random number generation heuristic will fail is when our technology is able to do two
magical things:
1. Create perfectly uniform transistors.
2. Fabricate  a  complex  processor  that  contains  billions  of  these  perfectly  uniform  transistors  without  introducing  any
manufacturing variations (i.e., a perfectly uniform, flawless, manufacturing process)
Additionally, CPUs would have to be designed so that performance is not dynamic (no more temperature, current, voltage, and
workload-based dynamic frequency scaling).
Until we reach this level of technology, which does not seem to be on the horizon, and CPUs somehow revert back to having
non-dynamic  performance  scaling  features,  the  proposed  side-channel-based  heuristic  is  likely  to  remain  a  good  candidate  for
ubiquitous secure random number generation across all our CPU-powered devices.
5.0 POTENTIAL IMPACT, USE CASES AND LIMITATIONS
Primarily, I envision SideRand as an open and auditable way for operating system kernels or hypervisors to seed their RNG. Initial
seeding during OS installation or first boot is a problem that still needs solving [10], which has led to the vulnerabilities that Heninger
et al have discovered [19]. While SideRand is easily extendable to be a general purpose CSPRNG, I’m not very concerned about that
right now; there are already great CSPRNGs around, we just need to solve the problem of initial seeding – creating that first 256-bits of
entropy in order for all these CSPRNGs to do their job properly.  Being open and auditable also means that the very core of our
cryptographic security – initial seeding and random number generation – is strengthened against potential backdoor attempts by
nation-states.
For servers, SideRand can serve as a replacement for TRNGs. This greatly improves auditability, as SideRand is easily auditable
(in its current implementation, a very simple Python 3 source file), whereas TRNGs are impossible to audit in live environments. This
will also serve to improve reliability. Hardware eventually fails, even known good hardware, whereas known good software does not,
and software is far easier to patch in live environments compared to swapping out hardware in case of eventually discovered defects or
needed tuning. 
One run of SideRand can replace or complement the entropy collector and random seeder in servers, devices and appliances that
would otherwise have poor entropy, solving the problems encountered by Heninger et al [19]. A single run of SideRand can produce a
key,  from which an unlimited number of keys can then be derived using standard deterministic  cryptography,  such as using the
SideRand-produced key as the nonce or initialization vector to a block cipher in counter mode (e.g. AES-256-CTR) [9].
Headless or embedded devices that previously suffer from “boot-time entropy-hole” can run SideRand during boot (or first-boot
only, depending on whether the entropy hole occurs every boot, or only during the first boot) and can afford for SideRand to run for a
minute or so (depending on the available timer resolution) to produce the needed strong key, and from there generate secure random
numbers using traditional cryptography, such as the aforementioned construction of a secure block cipher in counter mode.
Since target devices may range from large servers to small devices with micro-controllers like Arduino or RaspberryPi, tuning
issues will matter. SideRand can be tuned to handle faster processors or low-res timers by increasing the scale factor. Increasing the
number of samples collected (which default to 100) may also be a useful tuning parameter.
Processors or platforms with very low-res timers may run into a practical, usability limit – for example, needing several minutes
to produce a secure random number at first boot, which may not be acceptable to device manufacturers or vendors. This was simulated
in an experiment in Windows, using Python 3 time.time() which only has a timer resolution of 16ms. Even increasing the scale variable
to 10 million and taking 96 seconds to complete one run of SideRand, the quality of the collected values were abysmal – only 151
unique values out of 31,500 measurements (less than half a percent was unique), and the distribution was extremely biased towards a
few values. This may be improved with a generous increase in scale, but since this already needs 96 seconds to run, increasing scale by a
factor of 10 or more is already impractical. With a timer resolution of only milliseconds, SideRand is likely to be impractical, collect
significantly  weaker  entropy,  and  not  recommended  for  use.  Data  for  this  very-low-res-timer  experiment  is  also  available  as
supplemental information in the SideRand website.  Increasing the number of samples collected is likely to solve this,  but further
experiments are needed to test this scenario.
6.0 CONCLUSION
I presented SideRand, a heuristic and prototype for generating secure random numbers based on the inherent variability of benchmark
runtimes, with its worst-case entropy estimate shown to far exceed the required entropy in order to be considered cryptographically
secure.
I also proposed two criteria for confidence in sources of secure random numbers, openness and auditability, and showed how the
SideRand heuristic and prototype meets them. The design evolution of the SideRand prototype, from mark 1 to mark 10, was also
presented in order to better illustrate the design decisions taken in SideRand and the rationale behind them.
The SideRand mk10 prototype analyzed in this paper, however,  is far from widely production-ready. Being a Python 3 prototype,
it is only readily deployable in platforms with Python 3 support. The scale factor may also need tuning for different platforms. 
Further research and development work is recommended in the following areas:
1. Automatic tuning – a separate component should be developed that sets the scale factor dynamically. It is recommended that
this is a distinct component with its own source code separate from the SideRand source itself, so as to minimize negatively
affecting the auditability of the code. Automatic tuning could work as follows: during first run, the tuning component runs
SideRand  with  default  scale,  measures  the  unique  values  being  gathered  similar  to  the  unique_logger  tool,  then
increases/decreases/does nothing to the scale value depending on the measured values. The ideal values and adjustments
would be part of this further research.
2. More platforms – only Intel and AMD processors have been tested, from small-core architectures (Intel Atom, AMD Bobcat)
to large-core systems (Haswell & Skylake architectures, Pentium and i7 processors). While SideRand does not depend, in
theory and in implementation,  on any specific CPU instruction,  further tests  on other platforms is  recommended – for
example, micro-controllers like Arduino and Raspberry Pi. Different virtualized environments should also be tested.
3. More languages / software stacks – while Python 3 is a good choice for prototyping and is easily deployable in most x86
servers,  be  they Windows or  Linux,  it  isn’t  the  most  convenient  choice  for  smaller  platforms like  network  devices  or
appliances and embedded systems.  Implementing and testing the SideRand heuristic  in a more micro-controller-friendly
language or  development platform is recommended.
4. More detailed analysis of the entropy in the system – as currently implemented, SideRand’s worst-case entropy estimate
exceeds what is needed for cryptographic use. While this is good for most cases, for platforms that may encounter usability
limits due to having a very slow processor coupled with a very low-res timer, running an overkill algorithm does not help.
Further studies and analyses that refine the entropy estimate such that the effective workload can be significantly lessened
(e.g., less scale, less samples) may make SideRand more accessible to these devices with slow processors and low-res timers.
I hope that the resulting community review, scrutiny and acceptance of the SideRand heuristic, prototype, and derivatives will help
prevent vulnerabilities and other cryptography fails that stem from the difficulty of generating secure random numbers.
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